

No. 07-343

In the Supreme Court of the United States

PATRICK KENNEDY,

Petitioner,

v.

STATE OF LOUISIANA,

Respondent.

**On Writ of Certiorari to the
Louisiana Supreme Court**

**BRIEF OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
SOCIAL WORKERS; THE NATIONAL ASSO-
CIATION OF SOCIAL WORKERS, LOUISIANA
CHAPTER; THE NATIONAL ALLIANCE TO
END SEXUAL VIOLENCE; THE LOUISIANA
FOUNDATION AGAINST SEXUAL ASSAULT;
THE TEXAS ASSOCIATION AGAINST SEXUAL
ASSAULT; THE NEW JERSEY COALITION
AGAINST SEXUAL ASSAULT; AND THE MIN-
NESOTA COALITION AGAINST SEXUAL AS-
SAULT AS *AMICI CURIAE* IN SUPPORT OF
PETITIONER**

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INTEREST OF THE *AMICI CURIAE*

The *amici* are organizations of social workers and sexual assault crisis centers. They have substantial experience in treating child rape victims, helping their healing processes, and attempting to reduce the sexual exploitation of children. The *amici* thus have a strong interest in ensuring that sentencing schemes promote rather than hinder those goals.¹

The National Association of Social Workers (NASW) is the largest association of professional social workers in the world, with 145,000 members and 56 chapters throughout the United States and abroad (including the Louisiana chapter, which has 2,500 members). As part of its mission to improve the quality and effectiveness of social work practice—including with respect to the detection, treatment, and prevention of child sexual abuse—NASW promulgates professional standards and the *NASW Code of Ethics*, conducts research, provides continuing education, and advocates for sound public policies (including by filing *amicus* briefs in appropriate cases, before this Court and other courts). The NASW also supports the adoption of policies at the local, state, and national levels that promote assistance for victims of crime and ensure their safety and recovery from the

¹ Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 37.3, the parties have filed letters giving their blanket consent to the filing of *amicus* briefs in this case. Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 37.6, *amici* state that no counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part, and no counsel or party made a monetary contribution intended to fund the preparation of this brief. No person or entity, other than the *amici*, their members, or their counsel, made a monetary contribution to the preparation or submission of this brief.

crime, and supports research on the effects of crime on victims.

The National Alliance to End Sexual Violence (NAESV) is a national coalition of groups devoted to the rights of victims of sexual violence. The NAESV's Board of Directors consists of leaders of state sexual assault coalitions and national law, policy, and tribal experts who promote the NAESV's mission. The NAESV advocates on behalf of victims of sexual violence in support of efforts to create and improve services for victims and to combat sexual violence. In particular, it champions proposals that are grounded in research and that are assessed critically and routinely to ensure their effectiveness.

The Louisiana Foundation Against Sexual Assault (LAFASA) is a private nonprofit organization composed principally of Louisiana's sexual assault crisis centers. LAFASA provides a voice for victims of sexual assault; its activities include consulting with law enforcement, social workers, nurses, schools, and employers on sexual assault prevention, intervention, and investigation; coordinating the peer monitoring of its members' crisis centers; educating the public on sexual assault issues; and collaborating with state agencies and crime victims' groups on developing state and federal policies on sexual violence.

The Texas Association Against Sexual Assault (TAASA) is a private nonprofit organization of over 80 crisis centers in Texas. TAASA works to end sexual violence and to assist victims in obtaining healing and justice through community education, youth outreach, law enforcement training, and public policy advocacy. Because of the recent passage of a Texas statute that is similar to the Louisiana statute at issue here (The Jessica Lunsford Act, 2007 TEX. GEN.

LAWS ch. 593), TAASA has a particular interest in the outcome of this case.

The New Jersey Coalition Against Sexual Assault (NJCASA) consists of 22 sexual violence programs throughout New Jersey and individuals, students, and corporations concerned about ending sexual violence. Since its inception in 1981, NJCASA has been acting as an advocate for survivors and their loved ones statewide, while providing information and education to the public, media, and government officials regarding sexual violence issues. NJCASA is dedicated to developing and maintaining programs and services that support its mission of eliminating sexual violence and promoting the compassionate and just treatment of survivors and their loved ones.

The Minnesota Coalition Against Sexual Assault (MNCASA) is a private nonprofit organization of over 70 rape crisis centers in Minnesota and concerned citizens from across the state. MNCASA provides technical assistance and support to its member programs, educates the public on sexual violence, provides training and education, and advocates on behalf of sexual assault victims.

The *amici* have particular insight into the degree to which child rape is a terrible crime that greatly harms its victims. Accordingly, ending the scourge of sexual violence against children and aiding its victims are among the primary missions of the *amici*. Louisiana's aggravated rape law, LA. REV. STAT. § 14:42, undermines the *amici*'s shared goals of combating the sexual exploitation of children and facilitating the recovery of child victims. That statute provides that any act of oral-genital contact or anal or vaginal penetration of a child under the age of 13

years is a capital offense. *Id.* §§ 14:41–14:42. By permitting the execution of perpetrators of child sexual abuse, the statute will likely have exactly the wrong effect: rather than protecting children, it will increase the number of victimized children, encourage offenders to kill their victims, and hinder victims’ healing process.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

This Court has held that the death penalty for the offense of raping a 16-year-old woman violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment because such a penalty “makes no measurable contribution to acceptable goals of punishment and hence is nothing more than the purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering.” *Coker v. Georgia*, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977). Louisiana’s capital aggravated rape statute is, if anything, even worse than the statute at issue in *Coker*. The imposition of the death penalty for child rape affirmatively *harms* the very children whom it is intended to help. The Court therefore should invalidate the Louisiana statute in order to prevent those harms.

A. Executing child rapists will likely worsen the problem of underreporting that already frustrates efforts to combat sexual offenses against children. The overwhelming majority of sexual abuse is committed by victims’ family members or close family friends. These relationships lead many victims—as well as family members who witness or suspect the abuse—to remain silent rather than to report the crime. For example, victims and other family members may fear the consequences of the abuser’s prosecution and incarceration.

Louisiana's capital rape statute dramatically aggravates this problem. By magnifying the possible effects of a report of child rape, the Louisiana statute will likely ensure that fewer victims are identified and receive treatment—and that fewer abusers are stopped from continuing to abuse their victims and from victimizing even more children.

The increasing failure of the system to identify victims will produce a variety of harms for decades to come. Some harm will be immediate, in the form of continued abuse, while others will take years to manifest: beyond the rise in the number of victims per offender, many former abuse victims may face a host of long-term mental-health and substance-abuse problems because the abuse was allowed to continue.

B. Because Louisiana's penalty scheme does away with the marginal deterrence that is a central feature of punishment theory, the scheme will also encourage abusers to *kill* their victims. Under Louisiana law, abusers face no greater penalty for raping and killing their victims than for solely raping them; thus, it is more likely that an abuser will choose to eliminate the victim, who is in many instances the sole witness to the crime.

C. Even were Louisiana's penalty scheme to function as the legislature presumably hoped—*i.e.*, with abusers brought to trial and child victims testifying against them—Louisiana's law would greatly magnify the trauma that child victims already experience while participating in the criminal justice process. Even ordinary trials are highly traumatic for child victims; death-penalty trials, with their vastly increased publicity, expansive hearings, and multiplying pre-trial and post-conviction proceedings, will intensify that trauma by increasing the

scope and duration of the child victim's participation in the criminal justice system. Not only will this increased exposure hinder child victims' healing process, the imposition of a death sentence also will add to the guilt that child victims sometimes feel and may preclude the possibility of a future therapeutic meeting between the victim and his or her abuser.

D. Finally, the message sent to child victims by Louisiana's imposition of the death penalty on child rapists—that child rape is as terrible a crime as the worst murder—will impede victims' recovery. By equating the two crimes, child victims may come to believe that they, like murder victims, are irreparably harmed. That result would undermine victims' ability to heal.

ARGUMENT

The Court Should Eliminate The Death Penalty For Child Rape, A Penalty That Harms Abused Children Rather Than Helps Them.

In *Coker v. Georgia, supra*, this Court held that the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution forbids a state from executing the rapist of a 16-year-old woman because the penalty “makes no measurable contribution to acceptable goals of punishment and hence is nothing more than the purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering.” 433 U.S. at 592. Louisiana's capital aggravated-rape statute is similarly wanton.

First, imposing the death penalty for child rape will reduce the likelihood that abuse will be reported and stopped, thus increasing the amount of abuse the victim suffers as well as the number of children whom each abuser can victimize. Second, by equalizing the penalties for child rape and murder, Louisi-

ana's statute encourages abusers to kill their victims. Third, when a case does go to trial under Louisiana's death penalty law, the trauma caused by the extensive trial process itself and the prolonged notoriety the case will generate will be even more severe and long-lasting, greatly hindering the healing process. Finally, imposing the same penalty for child rape as for murder will signal to child rape victims that society believes them to be as irreparably harmed as murder victims and thereby impede child victims' recovery. This Court should therefore reaffirm *Coker* and clarify that the Eighth Amendment precludes imposition of the death penalty for rape regardless of the victim's age.

A. Permitting the death penalty for child rape will worsen the problem of under-reporting sexual abuse.

1. Child sexual abuse is disturbingly frequent. Estimates on the reported number of yearly victims range from about 83,000 to 217,000 children.² The actual number of victims is almost certainly much higher than even these numbers would suggest. In one of the most frequently cited articles on the prevalence of child sexual abuse, the author evaluated data from multiple retrospective surveys of adults and concluded that "there is considerable accumu-

² See, e.g., U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, *Child Maltreatment 2005* 41 tbl. 3-6 (2007) (estimating 83,810 reported incidents in 2005 by aggregating data from Child Protective Services reports); Andrea J. Sedlak & Diane D. Broadhurst, *Third National Incidence Study of Child Abuse and Neglect* 2-1 through 2-3, 3-3 tbl. 3-1 (1996) (estimating 217,700 victims in 1993 by canvassing more types of law enforcement agencies as well as reports from schools, day-care centers, and mental-health agencies).

lated evidence that at least 20% of American women and 5% to 10% of American men experienced some form of abuse as children.” David Finkelhor, *Current Information on the Scope and Nature of Sexual Abuse*, 4 THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN 31, 42 (Summer/Fall 1994).³ This evidence suggests that a relatively conservative estimate would be that 500,000 children are sexually abused in America each year. See *id.* at 34.

The overwhelming majority of these victims were abused by family members or others close to the family. Nearly 70 percent were abused by parental figures, family members, day-care providers, or a friend or neighbor. See U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, *supra*, at 59 tbl. 3-17. In one study of rapes of girls under the age of twelve, 96 percent of the victims reported that they knew the rapist.⁴

2. Research has shown that most victims “do not disclose their abuse to anyone.” Gail E. Wyatt *et al.*, *The Prevalence and Circumstances of Child Sexual Abuse: Changes Across a Decade*, 23 CHILD ABUSE &

³ The number of male children who have been sexually abused may be even higher than this study suggests, because males may be “more reluctant to disclose abuse than girls” even years later. Tina B. Goodman-Brown *et al.*, *Why Children Tell: A Model of Children’s Disclosure of Sexual Abuse*, 27 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 525, 527 (2003) (reviewing the literature and noting that, in retrospective studies of child sexual-abuse victims, men were less likely to have disclosed their abuse during childhood).

⁴ See Patrick A. Langan & Caroline Wolf Harlow, U.S. Department of Justice, *Child Rape Victims, 1992* 2 (June 1994) (estimating that about 17,000 girls under age twelve were raped in 1992, with the father being the offender one-fifth of the time).

NEGLECT 45, 46 (1996) (collecting studies).⁵ The reluctance to report sexual abuse is particularly high for abuse by family members.⁶

⁵ See also Rochelle F. Hanson *et al.*, *Factors Related to the Reporting of Childhood Rape*, 23 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 559, 564 (1999) (reporting that 82.9 percent of female rape victims under the age of 18 did not disclose the abuse to the authorities); Daniel W. Smith *et al.*, *Delay in Disclosure of Childhood Rape: Results From a National Survey*, 24 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 273, 278 (2000) (reporting that 9 percent of surveyed women had been raped as children and that 28 percent of those victims had never previously disclosed the abuse to anyone); Kamala London *et al.*, *Disclosure of Child Sexual Abuse: What Does the Research Tell Us About the Ways That Children Tell?*, 11 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 194, 201 (2005) (reporting that ten out of eleven retrospective studies “indicated that only one third of adults who suffered [child sexual abuse] revealed the abuse to anyone during childhood”); Kim English, *The Containment Approach to Managing Sex Offenders*, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 1255, 1267 (2004) (“the ratio of arrest to self-reported (anonymous) sex crime was approximately 1:30 for those who engaged in rape and child molesting”); William Winslade *et al.*, *Castrating Pedophiles Convicted of Sex Offenses Against Children: New Treatment or Old Punishment?*, 51 SMU L. REV. 349, 363 (1998) (“child sexual abuse may be underreported by as much as eighty percent, meaning that only about twenty percent of the sexual abuse victims actually have their victimization reported”).

⁶ See, *e.g.*, Goodman-Brown *et al.*, 27 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT at 527, 537 (reporting that “[c]hildren whose abuse was intrafamilial took longer to disclose their abuse than did children whose abuse was extrafamilial” and that “children were least likely to disclose when the perpetrator was a natural parent, with 53% of these children never disclosing (the incest was discovered by accidental means)”; Smith, 24 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT at 279, 283 (finding that only 12 percent of child rape victims reported their assaults to authorities and that delayed disclosure was associated with a familial relationship); see also *id.* at 284–285 (reporting that “[r]apes perpetrated by strangers were much more likely to be disclosed to someone within 1

Victims are inhibited from coming forward out of shame, guilt, fear of being punished, and fear that the abuser will retaliate against the victim or other family members.⁷ Victims also remain silent because they fear the consequences for the *abuser*, either out of confused loyalty or love or because the abuser has explained that “the family would become destitute should others learn of their behavior [and the abuser be arrested].” Gene G. Abel *et al.*, *Complications, Consent, and Cognitions in Sex Between Children and Adults*, 7 INT’L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 89, 99 (1984).⁸ The intensity of the turmoil that victims experience in disclosing sexual abuse is so severe that, of the

month than rapes by either family members or nonfamily acquaintances” and that “rape by a stranger was the best individual predictor of whether a child would tell someone else about her rape relatively quickly”).

⁷ See, *e.g.*, SETH L. GOLDSTEIN, *THE SEXUAL EXPLOITATION OF CHILDREN: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO ASSESSMENT, INVESTIGATION, AND INTERVENTION* 54–67 (2d ed. 1999); Wyatt *et al.*, 23 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT at 46 (collecting studies and noting that some victims do not disclose abuse “due to perceptions that the reporting process will * * * hurt other people important to the survivor”); Goodman-Brown, 27 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT at 537 (noting the desire to protect family members other than the abuser and citing fears about how non-offending parents will react, as well as a sense of responsibility for the abuse).

⁸ See also JOHN Q. LA FOND, *PREVENTING SEXUAL VIOLENCE: HOW SOCIETY SHOULD COPE WITH SEX OFFENDERS* 18 (2005) (listing fear of harm to the abuser as among the “cogent reasons” for not reporting); Goodman-Brown, 27 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT at 528 (“Fear of negative consequences of disclosure may be particularly salient in cases of incest because children may fear their parent will be punished.”) (citations omitted); Smith, 24 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT at 274 (“in cases of intrafamilial abuse victims often experience significant emotional conflict about making disclosures that implicate caretakers or other loved ones”) (citation omitted).

victims who do come forward, a fifth or more can be expected falsely to recant. See Lindsay C. Malloy *et al.*, *Filial Dependency and Recantation of Child Sexual Abuse Allegations*, 46 J. AM. ACAD. OF CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 162, 165 (Feb. 2007).

Other relatives also may be reluctant to disclose abuse for the same reasons that inhibit victims from coming forward: because of the family member's positive feelings for the abuser or because he or she fears the collateral consequences to the family if the abuse is disclosed.⁹ Indeed, as states have enacted statutes mandating that health professionals report child abuse, the actual number of reports has declined, apparently because families decide not to go to professionals when they know that doing so will mean that the abuse will be reported to authorities.¹⁰

3. In the considered view of *amici*, the threat of capital punishment for sexual abusers of children will greatly amplify the concerns that already prevent many victims and relatives from reporting abuse. Victims who love their abusers may be all the more reluctant to report abuse to police when the

⁹ See STEPHEN T. HOLMES & RONALD M. HOLMES, *SEX CRIMES* 86 (2d ed. 2002) (noting that a dependent spouse may not report abuse because of the stigma and economic consequences of her partner's incarceration); DOUGLAS J. BESHAROV, *RECOGNIZING CHILD ABUSE* 94 (1990) ("Conscious denial [of abuse] is often related to a parent's fear of family disintegration, legal consequences or the reaction of the other spouse."); Abel *et al.*, 7 INT'L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY at 99 (noting that some feared repercussions may actually occur).

¹⁰ F.S. Berlin *et al.*, *Effects of Statutes Requiring Psychiatrists to Report Suspected Sexual Abuse of Children*, 148 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 449 (1991).

possible consequences include lethal injection.¹¹ The reluctance may also be a product of the victim's own sense of responsibility for the abuse.¹²

Likewise, a non-offending family member, already facing "a difficult decision," HOLMES & HOLMES, *supra*, at 86, will face an even harder choice. The stigma of a possible death-penalty prosecution of a relative and its attendant publicity—as well as their feelings for the abuser—can only feed the fears that already inhibit non-offending family members from coming forward. Instead of encouraging the best-positioned witnesses—the victim and other family members—to report abuse, Louisiana's law will reinforce the internal constraints that many victims and their family members already feel.

4. The experience of the *amici* in encouraging child victims and their families to report abuse and to cooperate with the criminal justice process confirms the social science research. Victims and their relatives often are extremely reluctant to come forward because of the consequences of doing so that the criminal justice system creates.

Given the novelty of capital prosecutions for child rape, there is little secondary literature that directly assesses the impact these prosecutions will have on

¹¹ Cf. ANNA C. SALTER, TREATING CHILD SEX OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 216 (1988) (noting, in the context of treating victims, that "[p]articularly in incest cases, where the child may be very attached to the father, fear of loss may take precedence over the anger").

¹² See Goodman-Brown, 27 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT at 528 (noting that many sexually abused children "come to believe that they are at least partially responsible for their own abuse").

the rate of reporting by victims. But the *amici*'s collective experience in working with child victims and their family members leads them firmly to conclude that the mere threat of a possible death sentence for child rape will dramatically worsen the already-severe problem of underreporting that currently hinders the *amici*'s efforts in combating the sexual abuse of children.

5. Fewer reports by victims and family members will cause victims to endure continued abuse that otherwise would have been averted, with increasingly severe consequences.¹³ The wounds caused by child abuse are deep, but intervention and treatment, if obtained, can help the healing process.¹⁴ By contrast, the treatment prognosis for children who suffer from prolonged sexual abuse is much more bleak. For example, continued abuse increases the likelihood that the victim will subsequently engage in crime, become pregnant while a minor, drop out of school, abuse alcohol or drugs, and suffer from psychological disorders such as depression, anxiety disorders, and post-traumatic stress disorder.¹⁵

¹³ See GOLDSTEIN, *supra*, at 70; Abel *et al.*, 7 INT'L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY at 93.

¹⁴ See SALTER, *supra*, at 248 ("In cases in which there is no intervention, the powerlessness of the victim often continues even after the abuse itself has stopped.").

¹⁵ See Barbara Tatem Kelly, U.S. Department of Justice, *In the Wake of Childhood Maltreatment 2* (Aug. 1997); Paula K. Lundberg-Love, *The Resilience Of The Human Psyche: Recognition And Treatment Of The Adult Survivor Of Incest*, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SEXUAL VICTIMIZATION: A HANDBOOK 5–8 (Michele Antoinette Paludi ed., 1999). See also Jill Goldman *et al.*, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, *A Coordinated Response to Child Abuse and Neglect: The Foundation for Prac-*

Notably, the damage caused by Louisiana’s statute will not be limited to the abusers’ current victims. “Sex offenders who are not arrested, convicted, and sent to prison remain free to commit more sex crimes.” LA FOND, *supra*, at 32; see also HOLMES & HOLMES, *supra*, at 89. Rates of recidivism are lower than popular perception would have it, but they are still significant: one study found that 10 percent of child molesters offend again within 4 to 5 years, and other studies have found that recidivism rates grow higher when the time span is extended.¹⁶

6. Nor will these effects remain confined to Louisiana’s borders. Laypersons in other states, who may not comprehend the finer points of our federal system, may be deterred from reporting child sexual assaults based on the conclusion that the doubtless-well-publicized execution of Patrick Kennedy means that any state (perhaps their own) can impose the same penalties for the same conduct. Moreover, offenders in Louisiana who will go undetected may commit offenses in other states. Finally, the increasing number of victims means that more former abuse victims will ultimately leave the state, carrying with them the burdens worsened by Louisiana’s law.

* * * * *

tice 36 (2003) (in reaction to “persistent stress associated with ongoing maltreatment, the child’s brain may strengthen the pathways among neurons that are involved in the fear response. As a result, the brain may become ‘wired’ to experience the world as being hostile and uncaring.”).

¹⁶ See R. Karl Hanson, *Who is Dangerous and When are they Safe? Risk Assessment with Sexual Offenders*, in PROTECTING SOCIETY FROM SEXUALLY DANGEROUS OFFENDERS 64–65 (Bruce J. Winick and John Q. La Fond eds., 2003).

Accordingly, the Court should invalidate Louisiana's capital-punishment scheme, which will otherwise exacerbate the underreporting problem, causing extremely harmful ripple effects that will linger for decades.

B. Allowing Louisiana to execute child rapists will increase the incentives that child molesters have to kill their victims.

By tying the level of punishment to the severity of the crime, criminal law seeks to reduce the severity of criminal activity.¹⁷ Imposing the death penalty for child rape upsets this basic tenet of penalty schemes—marginal deterrence—with potentially devastating effects nationwide.

If the death penalty is reserved for murder, then sex offenders have an incentive to stop short of killing their victims. By imposing the death penalty for child rape, Louisiana's statute dangerously realigns sex offenders' incentives. If an offender believes that he will be sentenced to death if convicted of either raping a child or both raping and murdering that child, the offender will have every incentive to kill his victim and thus eliminate the primary witness to the crime.¹⁸ The offender will, as a result, also be

¹⁷ See, e.g., *United States v. Beier*, 490 F.3d 572, 575 (7th Cir. 2007) (“the concept of marginal deterrence * * * is that punishing two crimes of different gravity the same is unsound”); see also STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 518–19 (2004); JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 178 (1789); CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS, AND OTHER WRITINGS 21 (Richard Bellamy ed., 1995) (1767).

¹⁸ See, e.g., Corey Rayburn, *Better Dead Than R(ap)ed?: The Patriarchal Rhetoric Driving Capital Rape Statutes*, 78 ST. JOHN'S

more likely to remain free to abuse additional children, in Louisiana and elsewhere.¹⁹

Moreover, abusers who are not known by their victims will have the strongest incentives to kill.²⁰ Because these cases are the ones in which child victims are most likely to report the abuse, the Louisiana law eliminates the increase in penalty that may have dissuaded some stranger perpetrators from killing—and thus silencing—their victims. Thus, not only does the Louisiana statute inhibit reporting in the majority of child sexual assaults, which are committed by family members or acquaintances, see Part A, *supra*; the scheme also encourages stranger perpetrators to kill their victims. The perverse consequence of this is to reduce the likelihood that the offender will be apprehended and that the victim will survive and receive treatment.

L. REV. 1119, 1159 (2004) (“If murder does not incur additional punishment, then the motivation to kill the primary witness to the crime is strong.”).

¹⁹ Indeed, even child molesters in states that do not impose the death penalty may decide to kill their victims in response to news reports about Louisiana’s punishment scheme.

²⁰ Studies show that these abusers are already the most likely to kill their victims. See Lawrence A. Greenfeld, U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, *Sex Offenses and Offenders: An Analysis of Data on Rape and Sexual Assault* 30 (Feb. 1997) (reporting that “[s]exual assault murders were about twice as likely as all murders * * * to involve victims and offenders who were strangers”).

C. The Louisiana statute will greatly magnify the trauma that child victims already experience while participating in the criminal justice process.

It is well established that sexually abused children find the criminal justice process to be highly traumatic. Although Louisiana's death penalty law may reduce the number of child rape trials, that reduction will be more than offset by the greatly increased trauma that child victims will suffer in all cases—and especially in those in which trials do occur.

1. As a general matter, court proceedings increase and extend the harm suffered by the abused children:

In the midst of * * * vulnerability [following disclosure of abuse], the criminal justice, health, and social service systems may descend upon a child and family with such a devastating impact that its recipients are left with the feeling that the “cure” is far worse than the symptoms.

Kee MacFarlane, *Sexual Abuse of Children*, in *THE VICTIMIZATION OF WOMEN* 81, 97 (Jane Roberts Chapman & Margaret Gates eds., 1978). Indeed, some experts conclude that “children are often *more* traumatized by the court proceedings than by the sexual abuse.” KAREN L. KINNEAR, *CHILDHOOD SEXUAL ABUSE* 26 (2d ed. 2007) (emphasis added).²¹

²¹ See also Roger J.R. Levesque, *Prosecuting Sex Crimes Against Children: Time for “Outrageous” Proposals?*, 19 L. & PSYCHOL. REV. 59, 82 (1995) (“The best data shows that the likelihood that intervention, under the current system, may fail

Perhaps the most comprehensive study to have examined the effects of testifying on abused children was conducted by Gail S. Goodman. She found that child victims find testifying in criminal court to be traumatic, not cathartic. See GAIL S. GOODMAN *et al.*, TESTIFYING IN CRIMINAL COURT 50 (1992).²² Moreover, repeated courtroom testimony especially hinders healing. See *id.* at 51.

Goodman and other researchers recently updated her original study and interviewed about 80 percent of that study's participants. They found that, ten years later, having testified at trial was strongly associated with "negative outcomes" even "years after the legal cases ha[d] ended." JODI A. QUAS *et al.*, CHILDHOOD SEXUAL ASSAULT VICTIMS: LONG-TERM OUTCOMES AFTER TESTIFYING IN CRIMINAL COURT 72 (2005). Moreover, having testified repeatedly, which had been the "strongest" predictor of mental-health trauma in the short term, also was "associated with poorer later mental health, including more trauma-related symptoms"—even "for individuals who had improved in the short term." *Ibid.* The authors concluded that "testifying in the adversarial system appears to be a salient feature in and of itself with direct implications for negative outcomes, including years after legal cases have ended." *Ibid.*

or even harm the child victim is greater than we wish to acknowledge."); English, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 1258 ("Clinicians have often observed that the harm of some sexual abuse experiences lies less in the actual sexual contact than in the process of disclosure or even in the process of intervention.") (internal quotation marks omitted).

²² This Court cited an earlier version of this study in *Maryland v. Craig*, 497 U.S. 836, 855 (1990) (noting the "growing body of academic literature documenting the psychological trauma suffered by child abuse victims who must testify in court").

2. These findings strongly suggest that Louisiana's penalty scheme will impede victims' healing process. Based on their experience with child rape victims, *amici* firmly believe that the availability of the death penalty will substantially magnify the traumatic nature of the judicial process.

First, the introduction of the death penalty will likely increase the extent and duration of the victim's exposure to the trial process. Capital cases tend to feature more and lengthier pretrial proceedings than non-capital cases and take much longer to bring to trial. In fact, a recent study found that capital rape cases in Louisiana averaged 633 days from arrest to disposition, whereas non-capital rape cases averaged less than half as long—283 days.²³ The death penalty process itself also necessitates bifurcated trials, see *Gregg v. Georgia*, 428 U.S. 153, 195 (1976), which by definition last longer than non-capital trials and at each stage of which the victim may be required to testify.

In addition to producing more court proceedings requiring the victim's attendance or participation, the intensity of that participation also may increase. Capital defendants likely will seek to chip away at the protections that child abuse victims traditionally have enjoyed in court. Abusers on trial may argue, for example, that victims must testify and be subject to cross-examination in open court because "the acute need for reliable decisionmaking when the death penalty is at issue" (*Deck v. Missouri*, 544 U.S. 622, 632 (2005) (internal quotation marks omitted))

²³ See Angela D. West, *Death as Deterrent or Prosecutorial Tool? Examining the Impact of Louisiana's Child Rape Law*, 13 CRIM. JUST. POL'Y REV. 156, 183 (2002).

tilts the constitutional balance in favor of an abuser's "right to face his or her accusers in court" and against the "State's interest in the physical and psychological well-being of child abuse victims." *Craig*, 497 U.S. at 853; see also *ibid.* (noting that only "in some cases" would the State's interest in protecting the child witness "outweigh" the defendant's Confrontation Clause rights). Defendants also may urge states once again to require child victims' testimony to be corroborated or promptly reported to be admissible, thereby turning back the clock to the days when the law treated victims of sex crimes with deep suspicion. See Michelle J. Anderson, *The Legacy of the Prompt Complaint Requirement, Corroboration Requirement, and Cautionary Instructions on Campus Sexual Assault*, 84 B.U. L. REV. 945 (2004).

The fact that the case could result in the execution of the defendant also will heighten the distress felt by a testifying child victim, who in many cases may suffer tremendous guilt and remain emotionally attached to the perpetrator. One of the findings of the updated Goodman study is that the greater the distress of the victim while testifying—recorded by researchers using measures such as how emotional the child was on the witness stand—the poorer his or her adjustment ten or more years later.²⁴

Thus, one therapist recounts her first-hand observation of the effects of putting victims on the witness stand:

[I] will never forget the look on the face of a 9-year-old incest victim when her father was

²⁴ See QUAS, *supra*, at 102 (concluding that "[f]eeling more negative about having to testify * * * was associated with higher levels of" multiple measures of adverse mental health).

brought into the courtroom with chains and handcuffs around his hands and waist. * * * Her only comment before she withdrew into a spasmodic, twitching episode * * * was, “I did *that* to my Daddy?”

MacFarlane, *Sexual Abuse of Children, supra*, at 99 (emphasis in original). Because testifying against a parent or other loved one with the knowledge that death may follow conviction will assuredly make the experience even more distressing for the child, victims are more likely to experience intense and lasting negative effects.²⁵ Indeed, the Louisiana Supreme Court noted that, when the victim in this case was on the stand, she wept repeatedly and at length—including one interlude of at least 23 minutes. See Pet. App. 16a.

Moreover, the added publicity from a death-penalty prosecution may alone be sufficient to increase the trauma experienced by a victim for at least two reasons. First, more public attention will be focused on the victim, making his or her interactions with the criminal justice process more traumatic. As Chief Justice Burger observed in *Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court*, 457 U.S. 596 (1982), “having to relate the details of the crime in front of a crowd which inevitably will include voyeuristic strangers,” and which “may be expanded to include a live television audience, with reruns on the evening news,” may be a “devastating” experience for a child victim

²⁵ See QUAS, *supra*, at 102 (noting that older children’s greater awareness of legal consequences “probably contribute[s] to their increased distress both in anticipation of and while actually testifying”).

of a sex crime, “leav[ing] permanent scars.” *Id.* at 618 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).

Second, even aside from the added attention on the victim, “negative consequences for the child are more likely to result” from the increased notoriety of a death penalty case. Abel, 7 INT’L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY at 93. The secondary literature studying the effects of media accounts on child pornography victims confirms *amici’s* experience in this regard. Researchers have found that victims of child pornography suffer greater trauma with increased circulation of the pornographic materials. See, e.g., T. Christopher Donnelly, Note, *Protection of Children from Use in Pornography: Toward Constitutional and Enforceable Legislation*, 12 U. MICH. J. LAW REFORM 295, 301 (1979) (“The victim’s knowledge of publication of the visual material increases the emotional and psychic harm suffered by the child.”); see also *New York v. Ferber*, 458 U.S. 747, 759 (1982) (“the materials produced are a permanent record of the children’s participation and the harm to the child is exacerbated by their circulation”).

In addition, the extended appeals process that inevitably follows a death sentence will draw out the trauma and substantially hinder the healing process. The original Goodman study found that “by the time the cases were resolved, the behavioral adjustment of most, but not all children who testified was similar to that of children who did not take the stand.” GOODMAN, *supra*, at 114–115. While subsequent work reveals a more lasting impact, and the study did not and could not examine the effects of drawn-out death penalty appeals, Louisiana’s scheme will necessarily mean that those cases resulting in death sentences will not be “resolved” for many years. As of

2006, the length of time between sentencing and execution averaged over 12 years. Tracy L. Snell, U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, *Capital Punishment 2006*, at tbl. 11 (Dec. 2007), available at <http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/html/cp/2006/tables/cp06st11.htm>. During this period, not only would the publicity accompanying each stage of the appellate process dredge up traumatic memories for the victims, but the high reversal rate in capital cases²⁶ would subject many victims to one or more retrials at which they would again relive the abuse. This lack of closure almost certainly will hamper the healing process.

Furthermore, the trauma of the eventual execution itself—and the enormous publicity attendant to such an execution—almost invariably will impede the victim’s recovery. Cf. LA FOND, *supra*, at 25 (noting that triggering events may push “horrible memories of the crime” to the fore). In poet Maya Angelou’s memoir, *I Know Why the Caged Bird Sings*, she describes her own reaction, at the age of eight, to the news that her rapist—her mother’s boyfriend—had been killed. While testifying in court, Angelou had denied, falsely, that the man had ever touched her before the day he raped her. MAYA ANGELOU, *I KNOW WHY THE CAGED BIRD SINGS* 84–85 (1970). Her lie was motivated by her sense of guilt at having participated in the abuse or enjoyed the closeness and affection that followed it. *Ibid.* When she learned that the man had been killed, she blamed herself:

²⁶ See, e.g., James S. Liebman *et al.*, *Capital Attrition: Error Rates in Capital Cases, 1973–1995*, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1839, 1850 (2000) (68 percent reversal rate).

Obviously I had forfeited my place in heaven forever, and I was as gutless as the doll I had ripped to pieces ages ago. Even Christ Himself turned his back on Satan. Wouldn't He turn His back on me? I could feel the evilness flowing through my body and waiting, pent up, to rush off my tongue if I tried to open my mouth. I clamped my teeth shut, I'd hold it in. If it escaped, wouldn't it flood the world and all the innocent people?

Id. at 86–87. Angelou did not speak to anyone but her brother for more than a year. *Id.* at 87–100.

Aside from the trauma directly caused by the offender's execution, the fact that the abuser is executed precludes the possibility of future healing through a structured visit, which provides the victim with the opportunity to confront his or her abuser. The Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections maintains a Victim/Offender Dialogue program for the benefit of victims,²⁷ but an executed offender obviously could not participate in this process.

There can be little or no doubt that Louisiana's statute will, perversely, increase the trauma suffered by the victims of child rape.

D. Imposing the death penalty for child rape would equate the severity of that crime with the most egregious murders, thus impeding victims' recovery.

The message conveyed by the Louisiana statute is also, in itself, harmful to victims. This Court has

²⁷ See Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections, Victims Services, at http://www.doc.louisiana.gov/Victim%20Services/victim_services.htm.

repeatedly stated that the death penalty “must be reserved for the ‘worst of the worst.’” *Kansas v. Marsh*, 548 U.S. 163, 126 S. Ct. 2516, 2543 (2006) (Souter, J., dissenting); see also *Roper v. Simmons*, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005) (“Capital punishment must be limited to those offenders who commit a narrow category of the most serious crimes and whose extreme culpability makes them the most deserving of execution.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); *Atkins v. Virginia*, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002) (“[O]ur jurisprudence has consistently confined the imposition of the death penalty to a narrow category of the most serious crimes.”). The only group of offenders that this Court has ever held to constitute the “worst of the worst” is murderers whose crimes reflect “a consciousness materially more ‘depraved’ than that of any person guilty of murder.” *Godfrey v. Georgia*, 446 U.S. 420, 433 (1980); see also, e.g., *Enmund v. Florida*, 458 U.S. 782, 797 (1982) (disallowing the death penalty in a felony-murder case in which the defendant intended only that a robbery, not a murder, occur because robbery “does not compare with murder, which does involve the unjustified taking of human life”) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The message that the Louisiana statute sends to child rape victims is that they are akin to murder victims—that is, that they are irreparably harmed and that their lives are effectively over:

The most pernicious and insidious message conveyed by comparisons [of rape] to death is that those who have been raped have no reason to live. If it is true that those who have had to experience the ordeal of being raped have suffered a ‘fate worse than death’ that will haunt them for the rest of their lives,

then what reason do they have to continue living? If death is truly the lesser of two evils, why would someone hesitate to embrace it as an escape from the horrific experience of rape?

Rayburn, 78 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. at 1153–1154.

This message is perilous for the recovery of child victims, who will be increasingly inclined to view their rape as an insurmountable obstacle to a return to normalcy. Children who have already suffered the brutal trauma of rape must not be victimized yet again by a system that claims to have their best interests at heart.

* * * * *

The consequences of the Louisiana statute authorizing the death penalty for child rape are perverse—almost certainly increasing the amount of child sexual abuse, placing the victims of child abuse at greater risk of murder, and increasing the trauma that such victims suffer. This Court should invalidate the Louisiana statute to protect the victims of child rape and to clarify that, despite the heinous nature of this crime, the Eighth Amendment forbids the execution of child rapists.

CONCLUSION

The judgment of the Louisiana Supreme Court should be reversed.

Respectfully submitted.

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